came abstract and idealistic. A vast number of new spheres of consciousness and objects appeared in the private life of the private individual that were not, in general, subject to being made public (the sexual sphere and others), or were subject only to an intimate, conditional, closeted expression. The human image became multi-layered, multi-faceted. A core and a shell, an inner and an outer, separated within it.

We will show below that the most remarkable experiment to re-establish the fully exteriorized individual in world literature—although without the stylization of the ancient model—was made by Rabelais.

Another attempt to resurrect the ancient wholeness and exteriority, but on an entirely different basis, was made by Goethe.

But let us return to the Greek encomium and the first autobiography. As we have analyzed it, the defining characteristic of the ancient world's peculiar consciousness of self was the fact that biographical and autobiographical approaches to life were identical, and were, therefore, both necessarily public. But in the encomium the image of man is extremely simple and pre-formed; in it there is almost no quality of "becoming." The starting point for an encomium is the idealized image of a definite life type, a specific profession—that of military commander, ruler, political figure. This idealized form is nothing but an accumulation of all the attributes adhering to a given profession: a commander should be *like this*, followed by an enumeration of all the qualities and virtues of a commander. All these idealized qualities and virtues are then discovered in the life of the man being eulogized. The ideal is fused together with the figure of the deceased. The figure of the eulogized man is one that is already formed, and the figure is usually given us at the moment of its greatest maturity and fullness of life.

It was on the basis of biographical schemes developed for the encomium that the first autobiography arose, in the form of an advocatory oration: the autobiography of Isocrates, which was to have an enormous influence on all of world literature (and especially on Italian and English humanists). This was a public accounting of a man's own life, in the form of an *apologia*. Human image in such a form was shaped by the same principles as shaped the image of the deceased in the encomium. At its heart was the ideal of a rhetorician. Isocrates glorifies rhetorical activity as the loftiest of life's activities. Isocrates' professional self-consciousness is fully particularized. He gives us the details of his material circumstances, even mentioning how much money he makes as a rhetorician. Elements which are (from our point of view) purely personal, or (again from our point of view) narrowly professional, or matters relating to society and the state, or even philosophical ideas, are all laid out in one detailed series, tightly interwoven. All these elements are perceived as completely homogeneous, and they come together to form a single human image that is both complete and fully formed. The individual's consciousness of himself in such cases relies exclusively upon those aspects of his personality and his life that are turned outward, that exist for others in the same way they exist of the individual himself; in those aspects alone can self-consciousness seek its support and integrity; it knows of no aspects other than these, aspects that might be intimately personal, unrepeatably individual, charged with self.

Such is the normative and pedagogical character of this earliest autobiography. At its conclusion a formative and educational moral is baldly stated. But this same normative and pedagogical quality suffuses the entire autobiography

One must not forget, however, that the epoch that produced the first autobiography witnessed as well the initial stages in the breakdown of the Greek public wholeness of the human image (a wholeness that had manifested itself in epic and tragedy). Thus, this autobiography is still somewhat formal, rhetorical and abstract.

Another real-life chronotope is responsible for Roman autobiographies and memoirs. Both sprang from the soil of the Roman *family*. Such autobiographies are documents testifying to a family-clan consciousness of self. But on such family-clan soil, autobiographical self-consciousness does not become private or intimately personal. It retains a deeply public character.

The Roman patrician family—which was not a bourgeois family—is the symbol for all that can be private and intimate. The Roman family, precisely as a family, fuses directly with the state. Certain functions the state usually fulfills are entrusted to the heads of families. The religious cults of the family or clan (whose role was enormous) function as a direct extension of the cults of the state. The national ideal is represented by ancestors. Self-consciousness organizes itself around the particularized memory of a clan and ancestors, while at the same time looking toward future

descendants. The traditions of the family and clan had to be passed down from father to son. Thus every family had its own archive, in which written documents on all links in the clan were kept. Autobiography "writes itself" in the orderly process of passing clan and family traditions from link to link, and these were preserved in the archive. This made even autobiographical consciousness public and historical, national.

The specific historicity that Rome gave to autobiographical self-consciousness distinguishes it from its Greek counterpart, which was oriented toward living contemporaries, toward those who were actually there on the public square. Roman self-consciousness felt itself to be primarily a link between, on the one hand, deceased ancestors, and on the other, descendents who had not yet entered political life. Such self-consciousness is thus not as pre-formed as in the Greek model, but it is more thoroughly saturated with time.

Another specific peculiarity of Roman autobiography (and biography) is the role of the *prodigia*, that is, of various auguries and their interpretations. In this context they are not an external feature of the narrative (as they become in seventeenth-century novels), but an important means for motivating and shaping autobiographical material. Tightly tied up with them is the important, and purely Roman, autobiographical category of "fortune" (*fortuna*).

In the *prodigia*, that is, in the auguries of a man's fate—his separate acts and undertakings as well as his life as a whole—individualized and personal elements indissolubly fuse with state and public elements. The *prodigia* are an important moment at the beginning and at the completion of all state acts and undertakings; the state takes no step without having first read the omens. The *prodigia* are indicators of the fate of the state, predicting for it either fortune or misfortune. From the state level they move to the individual personality of the dictator or military commander, whose fate is indissolubly bound up with the destinies of the state, and readings of the *prodigia* for the state fuse with his personal destiny. The dictator of the lucky arm (Sulla) and of the lucky star (Caesar) appear. In this context the category of luck has a distinctive life-shaping significance. It becomes the form for expressing a personal identity and the course of a whole life ("faith in one's own star"). Such is the origin of Sulla's consciousness of self in his autobiography. But, we repeat, in the good fortune of a

Sulla or a Caesar, the destinies of the state and of single persons fuse into a single whole. There can be no question of anything narrowly personal, any private luck. This is, after all, a luck measured in deeds, in projects of state, in wars. This good fortune is absolutely inseparable from deeds, creative activity, labor—from objective, public and state-oriented content. Thus this concept of good fortune includes as well our concepts of "talent," "intuition" and that specific understanding of "genius"[7] that was so important in the philosophy and aesthetics of the late eighteenth century (Young, Hamann, Herder, the *Stürmer und Dränger*). In succeeding centuries this category of good fortune became more fragmented and private. Good fortune lost all its creative, public and state attributes—and came to represent a principle that was private, personal, and one that was ultimately unproductive.

Hellenistic Greek autobiographical traditions functioned alongside these specifically Roman ones. In Rome the ancient laments (*naenia*) were likewise replaced by funeral speeches, the so-called *laudatiae*. Here Greek and Hellenistic rhetorical schemas reigned supreme.

Works "on one's own writings" emerged as an authentic autobiographical form in the Roman-Hellenistic context. As we have shown above, this form reflected the crucial influence of the Platonic schema, that of the life course of a seeker after knowledge. But an entirely different objective support was found for it in this new context. What we get is a catalog of a man's works, an exposition of their themes, a record of their successes with the public, autobiographical commentary on them (Cicero, Galen and others). It is the sequence of one's own works that provides solid support for perceiving the passage of time in one's own life. The continuity of one's works provides a critical sequential marker for biographical time, its objectification. And furthermore, consciousness of self in this context is not revealed to some general "someone," but rather to a specific circle of readers, the readers of one's works. The autobiography is constructed for them. The autobiographical concentration on oneself and one's own life acquires here a certain minimum of essential "publicness," but of

7. In this concept of luck, the ideas of genius and success are fused together; thus an unrecognized genius was a *contradictio in adjecto* [a contradiction in terms].

a completely new type. St. Augustine's *Retractationes*[t] belong to this autobiographical type. In more recent times a whole series of humanistic works (for example, Chaucer) could be included in this type, but in later periods this type is reduced to a single stage (albeit very important) in artistic biographies (for example, in Goethe).

Such are the types of ancient autobiography, which might all be called forms for depicting the *public self-consciousness of a man.*

We will briefly touch upon the mature biographical forms of the Roman-Hellenistic epoch. Here one must note, first and foremost, the influence of Aristotle on the distinctive methods of the ancient biographers, and in particular his doctrine of entelechy as the ultimate purpose of development that is at the same time its first cause. This Aristotelian identification of ultimate purpose with origin inevitably had a crucial effect on the distinctive nature of biographical time. From here it follows that a character at its most mature is the authentic origin of development. It is here that we get that unique "inversion in a character's development" that excludes any authentic "becoming" in character. A man's entire youth is treated as nothing but a preliminary to his maturity. The familiar element of "movement" is introduced into biography solely as a struggle of opposing impulses, as fits of passion or as an exercise in virtue—in order to invest this virtue with permanence. Such struggles and exercises serve to strengthen qualities of character that are already present, but create nothing new. The base remains the stable essence of an already completed character.

Two models for structuring ancient biography were created on this base.

The first may be called the "energetic" type. At its heart lies the Aristotelian concept of *energia*: the full existence, the essence of a man is realized not by his condition, but by his activity, his active force ("energy"). This "energy" manifests itself as the unfolding of his character in deeds and statements. And these acts, words and other expressions of a man are not merely external manifestations (that is, for others, for a "third person") of

t. In his *Retractiones* (427 A.D.) Augustine criticizes his own superabundant output of ninety-three works from a religious point of view he felt he had only recently achieved, although he had sought to conform to it most of his adult life.

some internal essence of character existing apart from its effects, predating them and located outside them. The manifestations themselves constitute the character's being, which outside its energy simply does not exist. Apart from its surface manifestations, its ability to express itself, its visibility and audibility, character possesses no fullness of reality, no fullness of being. The greater the power of self-expression, the fuller the being.

Therefore human life (*bios*) and character may no longer be portrayed by means of an analytical enumeration of the characterological qualities of the man (his vices and virtues) and through their unification into a single stable image of him—but rather, one must portray him by means of his deeds, his speeches and other extensions and expressions of the man.

This energetic type of biography was first established by Plutarch, who has had an enormous influence on world literature (and not only on biography).

Biographical time in Plutarch is specific. It is a time that discloses character, but is not at all the time of a man's "becoming" or growth.[8] It is true that outside this disclosure, this "manifestation," there is no character—but in keeping with the principle of "entelechy," character is predetermined and may be disclosed only in a single defined direction. Historical reality itself, in which disclosure of character takes place, serves merely as a means for the disclosure, it provides in words and deeds a vehicle for those manifestations of character: but historical reality is deprived of any determining influence on character as such, it does not shape or create it, it merely manifests it. Historical reality is an arena for the disclosing and unfolding of human characters—nothing more.

Biographical time is not reversible vis-à-vis the events of life itself, which are inseparable from historical events. But with regard to character, such time *is* reversible: one or another feature of character, taken by itself, may appear earlier or later. Features of character are themselves excluded from chronology: their instancing can be shifted about in time. Character itself does not grow, does not change, it is merely *filled in*: at the beginning it is incomplete, imperfectly disclosed, fragmentary; it becomes *full* and well rounded only at the end. Consequently, the process of

8. Time is phenomenal; the essence of character is outside time. It is therefore not time that gives a character its substantiality.

disclosing character does not lead to a real change or "becoming" in historical reality, but rather solely to a *fulfillment*, that is, to a filling-in of that form sketched at the very outset. Such is the Plutarchian biographical type.

The second type of biography may be called *analytic*. At its heart we have a scheme with well-defined rubrics, beneath which all biographical material is distributed: social life, family life, conduct in war, relationships with friends, memorable sayings, virtues, vices, physical appearance, habits and so forth. Various features and qualities of character are selected out from the various happenings and events that occur *at different times in the hero's life*, but these are arranged according to the prescribed rubrics. To prove the rubric valid, only one or two examples from the life of a given personality need be provided.

In this way, the temporal progression of the biographical sequence is broken up: one and the same rubric subsumes moments selected from widely separate periods of a life. Here as well, what governs from the outset is the *whole* of the character; and from such a point of view time is of no importance at all, nor is the order in which various parts of this whole make their appearance. From the very first strokes (the first manifestations of character) the firm contours of the whole are already predetermined, and everything that comes later distributes itself within these already existing contours—in the temporal order (the first, energetic Plutarchian type) as well as in the systematic (the second, atemporal, type).

The major representative of this second ancient type of biography was Suetonius.[u] If Plutarch had exercised a profound influence on literature, especially on the drama (for the energetic type of biography is essentially dramatic), then Suetonius primarily influenced the narrowly biographical genre, particularly during the Middle Ages. Biography structured by rubrics survives to our very day: the biography of "a human being," "a writer," "a family man," "an intellectual" and so forth.

The forms that we have mentioned so far, autobiographical as well as biographical (and there was no distinction, in principle, between the approaches toward the individual adopted by each), had an essentially public character. We must now touch upon

u. Reference here is to *De viris illustribus*, written during the reign of Trajan, and consisting of biographies of Roman literary men arranged according to classes, such as "De grammaticus et rhetoribus," etc.

those autobiographical forms in which the breakdown of this public exteriority of a man is already evident, where the detached and singular individual's private self-consciousness begins to force itself through and bring to the surface the private spheres of his life. In the area of autobiography as well, we get in ancient times only the beginning of the process by which a man and his life become private. New forms for autobiographical expression of a *singular self-consciousness* were therefore not developed. Instead there ensued merely specific modifications of already available public and rhetorical forms. We will note three basic kinds of modifications.

The first modification consists of a satirico-ironic or humorous treatment, in satires and diatribes, of one's self and one's life. Special note should be taken of the familiar ironic autobiographies and self-characterizations in verse by Horace, Ovid and Propertius, which include an element of the parodying of public and heroic forms. Here personal and private topics, unable to find a positive form for their expression, are clothed in *irony* and *humor*.

A second modification, and one that has had important historical resonance, is represented by Cicero's letters to Atticus.

Public and rhetorical forms expressing the unity of the human image had begun to ossify, had become official and conventional; heroization and glorification (as well as self-glorification) were felt to be stereotyped and stilted. Moreover, the available public and rhetorical genres could not by their very nature provide for the expression of life that was private, a life of activity that was increasingly expanding in width and depth and retreating more and more into itself. Under such conditions the forms of *drawing-room rhetoric* acquired increasing importance, and the most significant form was the *familiar letter*. In this intimate and familiar atmosphere (one that was, of course, semiconventionalized) a new private sense of self, suited to the drawing room, began to emerge. A whole series of categories involving self-consciousness and the shaping of a life into a biography—success, happiness, merit—began to lose their public and state significance and passed over to the private and personal plane. Even nature itself, drawn into this new private and drawing-room world, begins to change in an essential way. "Landscape" is born, that is, nature conceived as horizon (what a man sees) and as the environment (the background, the setting) for a completely private, singular individual who does not interact with it. Nature of this kind differs sharply from nature as conceived in a pastoral idyll or

georgic—to say nothing of nature in an epic or tragedy. Nature enters the drawing-room world of private individuals only as picturesque "remnants," while they are taking a walk, or relaxing or glancing randomly at the surrounding view. These picturesque remnants are woven together in the unstable unity of a cultured Roman's private life; but they did not come together to form a single, powerful, animating independent nature complex, such as we see in epic or in tragedy (nature as it functions in *Prometheus Bound*, for instance). These picturesque remnants can exist only in the isolation created by closed verbal landscapes that surround them. Other categories as well undergo analogous transformations in this new little private drawing-room world. Numerous petty details of private life begin to take on an importance; in them, the individual feels himself "at home," his private sense of self begins to take its bearings from these petty details. The human begins to shift to a space that is closed and private, the space of private rooms where something approaching intimacy is possible, where it loses its monumental formedness and exclusively public exteriority.

Such is the characteristic space of the letters to Atticus. There is, nevertheless, a great deal in them that is still public and rhetorical, conventionalized and ossified—as well as much that is still vital and dynamic. It is as if the old public and rhetorical unity of the human image had been drenched with fragments of a future, thoroughly private man.

The third and final modification we will call the *stoic* type of autobiography. First and foremost, we must include in this group the so-called "consolationes" (consolations). These consolations were constructed in the form of a dialogue with Philosophy the Consoler. For our first example (one which has not survived) we must take the *Consolatio* of Cicero, which he wrote after the death of his daughter. Cicero's *Hortensius* belongs here as well. In succeeding epochs we meet such consolations in Augustine, Boethius and finally in Petrarch.

We must also include in this third modification Seneca's letters, Marcus Aurelius' autobiographical book ("To Myself")[v] and, finally, *The Confessions* and other autobiographical works of St. Augustine.

v. The reference is obscure here, but must be to the *Meditations* that Marcus Aurelius originally jotted down in notebooks for his own guidance. Only later, after his death, were they transcribed.

Typical of all the above-named works is the advent of a new form for relating to one's self. One might best characterize this new relationship by using Augustine's term "Soliloquia," that is, "solitary conversations with oneself." Conversations with Philosophy the Consoler in the consolations are, of course, also examples of such solitary conversations.

This is a new relationship to one's own self, to one's own particular "I"—with no witnesses, without any concessions to the voice of a "third person," whoever it might be. Here the self-consciousness of a solitary individual seeks support and more authoritative reading of its fate in its own self, without mediation, in the sphere of ideas and philosophy. There is even a place here for struggle with "another's" point of view—for example, in Marcus Aurelius. The point of view that "another" takes toward us—which we take into account, and by which we evaluate ourselves—functions as the source of vanity, vain pride, or as the source of offense. It clouds our self-consciousness and our powers of self-evaluation; we must free ourselves from it.

Another distinctive feature of this third modification is a sharp increase in the weight of events pertaining to one's own personal and intimate life; events enormously important in the private life of a given individual have no importance at all for others, and almost no larger social or political significance—for example, the death of a daughter (in Cicero's *Consolatio*); in such events a man feels himself to be preeminently alone. In events that have a public significance, however, the personal side of these events now begins to be accentuated. As part of this process, such issues as the transitoriness of all that is good, man's mortality, become very prominent; in general, the theme of personal death (and diverse variants on that theme) begins to play a crucial role in an individual's autobiographical self-consciousness (in public self-consciousness its role had been, of course, reduced almost to zero).

Despite these new features, even this third modification remains to a significant extent public and rhetorical. There is, as yet, nothing of that authentically solitary individual who makes his appearance only in the Middle Ages and henceforth plays such an enormous role in the European novel. Solitude, here, is still a very relative and naive thing. A sense of self is still rooted firmly in the public sphere, although this influence is well on the way to being ossified. The very Marcus Aurelius who excluded "another's point of view" (in his struggle to overcome his sensitivity

to insult) is, nevertheless, filled with a profound respect for his own public dignity, and he is haughtily grateful to fate and to other men for his virtues. And the very form assumed by autobiography in this third modification bears a public and rhetorical stamp. We have already said that even Augustine's *Confessions* require a noisy declamation.

Such are the basic forms of ancient autobiography and biography. They were to exercise enormous influence on the development of similar forms in European literature, as well as on the development of the novel.

IV. The Problem of Historical Inversion and the Folkloric Chronotope

In concluding our survey of ancient forms of the novel, we will note some general characteristics of the methods used to express time in these works.

How is the fullness of time treated in the ancient novel? We have already seen that in any temporal representation some minimum sense of time's fullness is inevitable (and literature's primary mode of representation *is* temporal). Moreover, there can be no question of reflecting an epoch outside of the passage of time, outside any contact with past or future, outside time's fullness. Where there is no passage of time there is also no *moment* of time, in the full and most essential meaning of the word. If taken outside its relationship to past and future, the present loses its integrity, breaks down into isolated phenomena and objects, making of them a mere abstract conglomeration.

Even the ancient novel had a certain minimum fullness of time peculiar to it alone. Such time is, so to speak, minimal in the Greek novel, and only slightly more important in the adventure novel of everyday life. In the ancient novel, this fullness of time has a dual character. In the first place, its roots are in a popular and mythological understanding of time's fullness. But these fixed, temporal forms were already in decay and, under conditions of sharp social differentiation beginning to be felt at that time, they could not of course incorporate and adequately shape new content. But these folkloric forms for expressing the fullness of time nevertheless functioned in the ancient novel.

On the other hand, the ancient novel also contained the feeble

first efforts at *new* forms for expressing time's fullness—forms related to the uncovering of social contradictions. Every such uncovering inevitably pushes time into the future. The more profoundly these contradictions are uncovered and the riper they become in consequence, the more authentic and comprehensive becomes time's fullness as the artist represents it. We have seen the first beginnings of such a real-life unity of time in the adventure novel of everyday life. But these first efforts were too feeble to stave off the collapse of the major epic forms into novelness.

Here it is imperative to pause on a distinctive feature of that feeling for time that exercised an enormous and determining influence on the development of literary forms and images.

This distinctive feature manifests itself preeminently in what might be called a *historical inversion*. The essence of this inversion is found in the fact that mythological and artistic thinking locates such categories as purpose, ideal, justice, perfection, the harmonious condition of man and society and the like in the *past*. Myths about paradise, a Golden Age, a heroic age, an ancient truth, as well as the later concepts of a "state of nature," of natural, innate rights and so on, are all expressions of this historical inversion. To put it in somewhat simplified terms, we might say that a thing that could and in fact must only be realized exclusively in the *future* is here portrayed as something out of the *past*, a thing that is in no sense part of the past's reality, but a thing that is in its essence a purpose, an obligation.

This peculiar "trans-positioning," this "inversion" of time typical of mythological and artistic modes of thought in various eras of human development, is characterized by a special concept of time, and in particular of future time. The present and even more the past are enriched at the expense of the future. The force and persuasiveness of reality, of real life, belong to the present and the past alone—to the "is" and the "was"—and to the future belongs a reality of a different sort, one that is more ephemeral, a reality that when placed in the future is deprived of that materiality and density, that real-life weightiness that is essential to the "is" and "was." The future is not homogeneous with the present and the past, and no matter how much time it occupies it is denied a basic concreteness, it is somehow empty and fragmented—since everything affirmative, ideal, obligatory, desired has been shifted, via the inversion, into the past (or partly into the present); en route, it has become weightier, more authentic and persuasive. In order to

we will not engage them here. For us the following is important: whatever these meanings turn out to be, in order to enter our experience (which is social experience) they must take on the *form of a sign* that is audible and visible for us (a hieroglyph, a mathematical formula, a verbal or linguistic expression, a sketch, etc.). Without such temporal-spatial expression, even abstract thought is impossible. Consequently, every entry into the sphere of meanings is accomplished only through the gates of the chronotope.

* * *

As we stated in the beginning of our essay, the study of temporal and spatial relationships in literary works has only recently begun, and it has been temporal relationships by and large that have been studied—and these in isolation from the spatial relationships indissolubly tied up with them. Whether the approach taken in this present work will prove fundamental and productive, only the further development of literary research can determine.

1937–1938[19]

19. The "Concluding Remarks" were written in 1973.

DISCOURSE IN THE NOVEL

The principal idea of this essay is that the study of verbal art can and must overcome the divorce between an abstract "formal" approach and an equally abstract "ideological" approach. Form and content in discourse are one, once we understand that verbal discourse is a social phenomenon—social throughout its entire range and in each and every of its factors, from the sound image to the furthest reaches of abstract meaning.

It is this idea that has motivated our emphasis on "the stylistics of genre." The separation of style and language from the question of genre has been largely responsible for a situation in which only individual and period-bound overtones of a style are the privileged subjects of study, while its basic social tone is ignored. The great historical destinies of genres are overshadowed by the petty vicissitudes of stylistic modifications, which in their turn are linked with individual artists and artistic movements. For this reason, stylistics has been deprived of an authentic philosophical and sociological approach to its problems; it has become bogged down in stylistic trivia; it is not able to sense behind the individual and period-bound shifts the great and anonymous destinies of artistic discourse itself. More often than not, stylistics defines itself as a stylistics of "private craftsmanship" and ignores the social life of discourse outside the artist's study, discourse in the open spaces of public squares, streets, cities and villages, of social groups, generations and epochs. Stylistics is concerned not with living discourse but with a histological specimen made from it, with abstract linguistic discourse in the service of an artist's individual creative powers. But these individual and tendentious overtones of style, cut off from the fundamentally social modes in which discourse lives, inevitably come across as flat and abstract in such a formulation and cannot therefore be studied in organic unity with a work's semantic components.

Modern Stylistics & the Novel

Before the twentieth century, problems associated with a stylistics of the novel had not been precisely formulated—such a formulation could only have resulted from a recognition of the stylistic uniqueness of novelistic (artistic-prose) discourse.

For a long time treatment of the novel was limited to little more than abstract ideological examination and publicistic commentary. Concrete questions of stylistics were either not treated at all or treated in passing and in an arbitrary way: the discourse of artistic prose was either understood as being poetic in the narrow sense, and had the categories of traditional stylistics (based on the study of tropes) uncritically applied to it, or else such questions were limited to empty, evaluative terms for the characterization of language, such as "expressiveness," "imagery," "force," "clarity" and so on—without providing these concepts with any stylistic significance, however vague and tentative.

Toward the end of the last century, as a counterweight to this abstract ideological way of viewing things, interest began to grow in the concrete problems of artistic craftsmanship in prose, in the problems of novel and short-story technique. However, in questions of stylistics the situation did not change in the slightest; attention was concentrated almost exclusively on problems of composition (in the broad sense of the word). But, as before, the peculiarities of the stylistic life of discourse in the novel (and in the short story as well) lacked an approach that was both principled and at the same time concrete (one is impossible without the other); the same arbitrary judgmental observations about language—in the spirit of traditional stylistics—continued to reign supreme, and they totally overlooked the authentic nature of artistic prose.

There is a highly characteristic and widespread point of view that sees novelistic discourse as an extra-artistic medium, a discourse that is not worked into any special or unique style. After failure to find in novelistic discourse a purely poetic formulation ("poetic" in the narrow sense) as was expected, prose discourse is denied any artistic value at all; it is the same as practical speech for everyday life, or speech for scientific purposes, an artistically neutral means of communication.[1]

Such a point of view frees one from the necessity of undertaking stylistic analyses of the novel; it in fact gets rid of the very problem of a stylistics of the novel, permitting one to limit oneself to purely thematic analyses of it.

It was, however, precisely in the 1920s that this situation changed: the novelistic prose word began to win a place for itself in stylistics. On the one hand there appeared a series of concrete stylistic analyses of novelistic prose; on the other hand, systematic attempts were made to recognize and define the stylistic uniqueness of artistic prose as distinct from poetry.

But it was precisely these concrete analyses and these attempts at a principled approach that made patently obvious the fact that all the categories of traditional stylistics—in fact the very concept of a *poetic* artistic discourse, which lies at the heart of such categories—were not applicable to novelistic discourse. Novelistic discourse proved to be the acid test for this whole way of conceiving style, exposing the narrowness of this type of thinking and its inadequacy in all areas of discourse's artistic life.

All attempts at concrete stylistic analysis of novelistic prose either strayed into linguistic descriptions of the language of a given novelist or else limited themselves to those separate, isolated stylistic elements of the novel that were includable (or gave the appearance of being includable) in the traditional categories of stylistics. In both instances the stylistic whole of the novel and of novelistic discourse eluded the investigator.

The novel as a whole is a phenomenon multiform in style and variform in speech and voice. In it the investigator is confronted with several heterogeneous stylistic unities, often located on different linguistic levels and subject to different stylistic controls.

1. As recently as the 1920s, V. M. Žirmunskij (important fellow-traveler of the Formalists, ed.) was writing: "When lyrical poetry appears to be authentically a work of *verbal art*, due to its choice and combination of words (on semantic as well as sound levels) all of which are completely subordinated to the aesthetic project, Tolstoy's novel, by contrast, which is free in its verbal composition, does not use words as an artistically significant element of interaction but as a neutral medium or as a system of significations subordinated (as happens in practical speech) to the communicative function, directing our attention to thematic aspects quite abstracted from purely verbal considerations. We cannot call such a *literary work* a work of *verbal art* or, in any case, not in the sense that the term is used for lyrical poetry" ("On the Problem of the Formal Method," in an anthology of his articles, *Problems of a Theory of Literature* (Leningrad, 1928, p. 173); Russian edition: "K voprosu o 'formal'nom metode'," in *Voprosy teorii literatury*, (L., 1928)).

We list below the basic types of compositional-stylistic unities into which the novelistic whole usually breaks down:

(1) Direct authorial literary-artistic narration (in all its diverse variants);
(2) Stylization of the various forms of oral everyday narration (*skaz*);
(3) Stylization of the various forms of semiliterary (written) everyday narration (the letter, the diary, etc.);
(4) Various forms of literary but extra-artistic authorial speech (moral, philosophical or scientific statements, oratory, ethnographic descriptions, memoranda and so forth);
(5) The stylistically individualized speech of characters.

These heterogeneous stylistic unities, upon entering the novel, combine to form a structured artistic system, and are subordinated to the higher stylistic unity of the work as a whole, a unity that cannot be identified with any single one of the unities subordinated to it.

The stylistic uniqueness of the novel as a genre consists precisely in the combination of these subordinated, yet still relatively autonomous, unities (even at times comprised of different languages) into the higher unity of the work as a whole: the style of a novel is to be found in the combination of its styles; the language of a novel is the system of its "languages." Each separate element of a novel's language is determined first of all by one such subordinated stylistic unity into which it enters directly—be it the stylistically individualized speech of a character, the down-to-earth voice of a narrator in *skaz*, a letter or whatever. The linguistic and stylistic profile of a given element (lexical, semantic, syntactic) is shaped by that subordinated unity to which it is most immediately proximate. At the same time this element, together with its most immediate unity, figures into the style of the whole, itself supports the accent of the whole and participates in the process whereby the unified meaning of the whole is structured and revealed.

The novel can be defined as a diversity of social speech types (sometimes even diversity of languages) and a diversity of individual voices, artistically organized. The internal stratification of any single national language into social dialects, characteristic group behavior, professional jargons, generic languages, languages of generations and age groups, tendentious languages, languages of the authorities, of various circles and of passing fashions, languages that serve the specific sociopolitical purposes of the day, even of the hour (each day has its own slogan, its own vocabulary, its own emphases)—this internal stratification present in every language at any given moment of its historical existence is the indispensable prerequisite for the novel as a genre. The novel orchestrates all its themes, the totality of the world of objects and ideas depicted and expressed in it, by means of the social diversity of speech types [*raznorečie*] and by the differing individual voices that flourish under such conditions. Authorial speech, the speeches of narrators, inserted genres, the speech of characters are merely those fundamental compositional unities with whose help heteroglossia [*raznorečie*] can enter the novel; each of them permits a multiplicity of social voices and a wide variety of their links and interrelationships (always more or less dialogized). These distinctive links and interrelationships between utterances and languages, this movement of the theme through different languages and speech types, its dispersion into the rivulets and droplets of social heteroglossia, its dialogization—this is the basic distinguishing feature of the stylistics of the novel.

Such a combining of languages and styles into a higher unity is unknown to traditional stylistics; it has no method for approaching the distinctive social dialogue among languages that is present in the novel. Thus stylistic analysis is not oriented toward the novel as a whole, but only toward one or another of its subordinated stylistic unities. The traditional scholar bypasses the basic distinctive feature of the novel as a genre; he substitutes for it another object of study, and instead of novelistic style he actually analyzes something completely different. He transposes a symphonic (orchestrated) theme on to the piano keyboard.

We notice two such types of substitutions: in the first type, an analysis of novelistic style is replaced by a description of the language of a given novelist (or at best of the "languages" of a given novel); in the second type, one of the subordinated styles is isolated and analyzed as if it were the style of the whole.

In the first type, style is cut off from considerations of genre, and from the work as such, and regarded as a phenomenon of language itself: the unity of style in a given work is transformed either into the unity of an individual language ("individual di-

alect"), or into the unity of an individual speech (*parole*). It is precisely the individuality of the speaking subject that is recognized to be that style-generating factor transforming a phenomenon of language and linguistics into a stylistic unity.

We have no need to follow where such an analysis of novelistic style leads, whether to a disclosing of the novelist's individual dialect (that is, his vocabulary, his syntax) or to a disclosing of the distinctive features of the work taken as a "complete speech act," an "utterance." Equally in both cases, style is understood in the spirit of Saussure: as an individualization of the language (in the sense of a system of general language norms). Stylistics is transformed either into a curious kind of linguistics treating individual languages, or into a linguistics of the utterance.

In accordance with the point of view selected, the unity of a style thus presupposes on the one hand a unity of language (in the sense of a system of general normative forms) and on the other hand the unity of an individual person realizing himself in this language.

Both these conditions are in fact obligatory in the majority of verse-based poetic genres, but even in these genres they far from exhaust or define the style of the work. The most precise and complete description of the individual language and speech of a poet—even if this description does choose to treat the expressiveness of language and speech elements—does not add up to a stylistic analysis of the work, inasmuch as these elements relate to a system of language or to a system of speech, that is, to various linguistic unities and not to the system of the artistic work, which is governed by a completely different system of rules than those that govern the linguistic systems of language and of speech.

But—we repeat—in the majority of poetic genres, the unity of the language system and the unity (and uniqueness) of the poet's individuality as reflected in his language and speech, which is directly realized in this unity, are indispensable prerequisites of poetic style. The novel, however, not only does not require these conditions but (as we have said) even makes of the internal stratification of language, of its social heteroglossia and the variety of individual voices in it, the prerequisite for authentic novelistic prose.

Thus the substitution of the individualized language of the novelist (to the extent that one can recover this language from

the "speech" and "language" systems of the novel) for the style of the novel itself is doubly imprecise: it distorts the very essence of a stylistics of the novel. Such substitution inevitably leads to the selection from the novel of only those elements that can be fitted within the frame of a single language system and that express, directly and without mediation, an authorial individuality in language. The whole of the novel and the specific tasks involved in constructing this whole out of heteroglot, multi-voiced, multi-styled and often multi-languaged elements remain outside the boundaries of such a study.

Such is the first type of substitution for the proper object of study in the stylistic analysis of the novel. We will not delve further into the diverse variations of this type, which are determined by the different ways in which such concepts as "the speech whole," "the system of language," "the individuality of the author's language and speech" are understood, and by a difference in the very way in which the relationship between style and language is conceived (and also the relationship between stylistics and linguistics). In all possible variants on this type of analysis, which acknowledge only one single language and a single authorial individuality expressing itself directly in that language, the stylistic nature of the novel slips hopelessly away from the investigator.

The second type of substitution is characterized not by an orientation toward the language of the author, but rather toward the style of the novel itself—although style thus understood is narrowed down to mean the style of merely one out of the several subordinated unities (which are relatively autonomous) within the novel.

In the majority of cases the style of the novel is subsumed under the concept of "epic style," and the appropriate categories of traditional stylistics are applied to it. In such circumstances only those elements of epic representation (those occurring predominantly in direct authorial speech) are isolated from the novel for consideration. The profound difference between novelistic and purely epic modes of expression is ignored. Differences between the novel and the epic are usually perceived on the level of composition and thematics alone.

In other instances, different aspects of novelistic style are selected out as most characteristic of one or another concrete literary work. Thus the narrational aspect can be considered from the

point of view not of its objective descriptive mode, but of its subjective expression mode (expressiveness). One might select elements of vernacular extraliterary narration (*skaz*) or those aspects that provide the information necessary to further the plot (as one might do, for example, in analyzing an adventure novel).[2] And it is possible, finally, to select those purely dramatic elements of the novel that lower the narrational aspect to the level of a commentary on the dialogues of the novel's characters. But the system of languages in drama is organized on completely different principles, and therefore its languages sound utterly different than do the languages of the novel. In drama there is no all-encompassing language that addresses itself dialogically to separate languages, there is no second all-encompassing plotless (nondramatic) dialogue outside that of the (nondramatic) plot.

All these types of analysis are inadequate to the style not only of the novelistic whole but even of that element isolated as fundamental for a given novel—inasmuch as that element, removed from its interaction with others, changes its stylistic meaning and ceases to be that which it in fact had been in the novel.

The current state of questions posed by a stylistics of the novel reveals, fully and clearly, that all the categories and methods of traditional stylistics remain incapable of dealing effectively with the artistic uniqueness of discourse in the novel, or with the specific life that discourse leads in the novel. "Poetic language," "individuality of language," "image," "symbol," "epic style" and other general categories worked out and applied by stylistics, as well as the entire set of concrete stylistic devices subsumed by these categories (no matter how differently understood by individual critics), are all equally oriented toward the single-languaged and single-styled genres, toward the poetic genres in the narrow sense of the word. Their connection with this exclusive orientation explains a number of the particular features and limitations of traditional stylistic categories. All these categories, and the very philosophical conception of poetic discourse in which they are grounded, are too narrow and cramped, and cannot accommodate the artistic prose of novelistic discourse.

2. Artistic prose style has been studied in Russia by the Formalists largely on these two last levels, that is, either *skaz* (Eichenbaum) or plot-informational aspects (Shklovsky) were studied as most characteristic of literary prose.

Thus stylistics and the philosophy of discourse indeed confront a dilemma: either to acknowledge the novel (and consequently all artistic prose tending in that direction) an unartistic or quasi-artistic genre, or to radically reconsider that conception of poetic discourse in which traditional stylistics is grounded and which determines all its categories.

This dilemma, however, is by no means universally recognized. Most scholars are not inclined to undertake a radical revision of the fundamental philosophical conception of poetic discourse. Many do not even see or recognize the philosophical roots of the stylistics (and linguistics) in which they work, and shy away from any fundamental philosophical issues. They utterly fail to see behind their isolated and fragmented stylistic observations and linguistic descriptions any theoretical problems posed by novelistic discourse. Others—more principled—make a case for consistent individualism in their understanding of language and style. First and foremost they seek in the stylistic phenomenon a direct and unmediated expression of authorial individuality, and such an understanding of the problem is least likely of all to encourage a reconsideration of basic stylistic categories in the proper direction.

However, there is another solution of our dilemma that does take basic concepts into account: one need only consider oft-neglected rhetoric, which for centuries has included artistic prose in its purview. Once we have restored rhetoric to all its ancient rights, we may adhere to the old concept of poetic discourse, relegating to "rhetorical forms" everything in novelistic prose that does not fit the Procrustean bed of traditional stylistic categories.[3] Gustav Shpet,[a] in his time, proposed such a solution to the dilemma, with all due rigorousness and consistency. He utterly ex-

3. Such a solution to the problem was especially tempting to adherents of the formal method in poetics: in fact, the re-establishment of rhetoric, with all its rights, greatly strengthens the Formalist position. Formalist rhetoric is a necessary addition to Formalist poetics. Our Formalists were being completely consistent when they spoke of the necessity of reviving rhetoric alongside poetics (on this, see B. M. Eichenbaum, *Literature*, [*Literatura*; Leningrad, 1927], pp. 147–148).

a. Gustav Shpet (1879–1937), outstanding representative of the neo-Kantian and (especially) Husserlian traditions in Russia; as professor at the University of Moscow for many years he influenced many (among others, the young Roman Jakobson).

rhetoric

cluded artistic prose and its ultimate realization—the novel—from the realm of poetry, and assigned it to the category of purely rhetorical forms.[4]

Here is what Shpet says about the novel: "The recognition that contemporary forms of moral propaganda—i.e., the *novel*—do not spring from *poetic creativity* but are purely rhetorical compositions, is an admission, and a conception, that apparently cannot arise without immediately confronting a formidable obstacle in the form of the universal recognition, despite everything, that the novel *does* have a certain aesthetic value."[5]

Shpet utterly denies the novel any aesthetic significance. The novel is an extra-artistic rhetorical genre, "the contemporary form of moral propaganda"; artistic discourse is exclusively poetic discourse (in the sense we have indicated above).

Viktor Vinogradov[b] adopted an analogous point of view in his book *On Artistic Prose*, assigning the problem of artistic prose to rhetoric. While agreeing with Shpet's basic philosophical definitions of the "poetic" and the "rhetorical," Vinogradov was, however, not so paradoxically consistent: he considered the novel a syncretic, mixed form ("a hybrid formation") and admitted that it contained, along with rhetorical elements, some purely poetic ones.[6]

The point of view that completely excludes novelistic prose, as a rhetorical formation, from the realm of poetry—a point of view that is basically false—does nevertheless have a certain indisputable merit. There resides in it an acknowledgment in principle and in substance of the inadequacy of all contemporary stylistics, along with its philosophical and linguistic base, when it comes to defining the specific distinctive features of novelistic prose. And what is more, the very reliance on rhetorical forms has a great heuristic significance. Once rhetorical discourse is

4. Originally in his *Aesthetic Fragments* [*Estetičeskie fragmenty*]; in a more complete aspect in the book *The Inner Form of the Word* [*Vnutrennjaja forma slova*] (M., 1927).

5. *Vnutrennjaja forma slova*, p. 215.

6. V. V. Vinogradov, *On Artistic Prose* [*O xudožestvennom proze*], Moscow-Leningrad, 1930, pp. 75–106.

b. Viktor Vinogradov (1895–1969), outstanding linguistic and student of style in literature, a friendly critic of the Formalists, and an important theorist in his own right (especially his work on *skaz* technique).

brought into the study with all its living diversity, it cannot fail to have a deeply revolutionizing influence on linguistics and on the philosophy of language. It is precisely those aspects of any discourse (the internally dialogic quality of discourse, and the phenomena related to it), not yet sufficiently taken into account and fathomed in all the enormous weight they carry in the life of language, that are revealed with great external precision in rhetorical forms, provided a correct and unprejudiced approach to those forms is used. Such is the general methodological and heuristic significance of rhetorical forms for linguistics and for the philosophy of language.

The special significance of rhetorical forms for understanding the novel is equally great. The novel, and artistic prose in general, has the closest genetic, family relationship to rhetorical forms. And throughout the entire development of the novel, its intimate interaction (both peaceful and hostile) with living rhetorical genres (journalistic, moral, philosophical and others) has never ceased; this interaction was perhaps no less intense than was the novel's interaction with the artistic genres (epic, dramatic, lyric). But in this uninterrupted interrelationship, novelistic discourse preserved its own qualitative uniqueness and was never reducible to rhetoric.

The novel is an artistic genre. Novelistic discourse is poetic discourse, but one that does not fit within the frame provided by the concept of poetic discourse as it now exists. This concept has certain underlying presuppositions that limit it. The very concept—in the course of its historical formulation from Aristotle to the present day—has been oriented toward the specific "official" genres and connected with specific historical tendencies in verbal ideological life. Thus a whole series of phenomena remained beyond its conceptual horizon.

Philosophy of language, linguistics and stylistics [i.e., such as they have come down to us] have all postulated a simple and unmediated relation of speaker to his unitary and singular "own" language, and have postulated as well a simple realization of this language in the monologic utterance of the individual. Such disciplines actually know only two poles in the life of language, between which are located all the linguistic and stylistic phenomena they know: on the one hand, the system of a *unitary language*, and on the other the *individual* speaking in this language.

Various schools of thought in the philosophy of language, in linguistics and in stylistics have, in different periods (and always in close connection with the diverse concrete poetic and ideological styles of a given epoch), introduced into such concepts as "system of language," "monologic utterance," "the speaking *individuum*," various differing nuances of meaning, but their basic content remains unchanged. This basic content is conditioned by the specific sociohistorical destinies of European languages and by the destinies of ideological discourse, and by those particular historical tasks that ideological discourse has fulfilled in specific social spheres and at specific stages in its own historical development.

These tasks and destinies of discourse conditioned specific verbal-ideological movements, as well as various specific genres of ideological discourse, and ultimately the specific philosophical concept of discourse itself—in particular, the concept of poetic discourse, which had been at the heart of all concepts of style.

The strength and at the same time the limitations of such basic stylistic categories become apparent when such categories are seen as conditioned by specific historical destinies and by the task that an ideological discourse assumes. These categories arose from and were shaped by the historically *aktuell* forces at work in the verbal-ideological evolution of specific social groups; they comprised the theoretical expression of actualizing forces that were in the process of creating a life for language.

These forces are *the forces that serve to unify and centralize the verbal-ideological world.*

Unitary language constitutes the theoretical expression of the historical processes of linguistic unification and centralization, an expression of the centripetal forces of language. A unitary language is not something given [*dan*] but is always in essence posited [*zadan*]—and at every moment of its linguistic life it is opposed to the realities of heteroglossia. But at the same time it makes its real presence felt as a force for overcoming this heteroglossia, imposing specific limits to it, guaranteeing a certain maximum of mutual understanding and crystalizing into a real, although still relative, unity—the unity of the reigning conversational (everyday) and literary language, "correct language."

A common unitary language is a system of linguistic norms. But these norms do not constitute an abstract imperative; they are rather the generative forces of linguistic life, forces that struggle to overcome the heteroglossia of language, forces that unite and centralize verbal-ideological thought, creating within a heteroglot national language the firm, stable linguistic nucleus of an officially recognized literary language, or else defending an already formed language from the pressure of growing heteroglossia.

What we have in mind here is not an abstract linguistic minimum of a common language, in the sense of a system of elementary forms (linguistic symbols) guaranteeing a *minimum* level of comprehension in practical communication. We are taking language not as a system of abstract grammatical categories, but rather language conceived as ideologically saturated, language as a world view, even as a concrete opinion, insuring a *maximum* of mutual understanding in all spheres of ideological life. Thus a unitary language gives expression to forces working toward concrete verbal and ideological unification and centralization, which develop in vital connection with the processes of sociopolitical and cultural centralization.

Aristotelian poetics, the poetics of Augustine, the poetics of the medieval church, of "the one language of truth," the Cartesian poetics of neoclassicism, the abstract grammatical universalism of Leibniz (the idea of a "universal grammar"), Humboldt's insistence on the concrete—all these, whatever their differences in nuance, give expression to the same centripetal forces in sociolinguistic and ideological life; they serve one and the same project of centralizing and unifying the European languages. The victory of one reigning language (dialect) over the others, the supplanting of languages, their enslavement, the process of illuminating them with the True Word, the incorporation of barbarians and lower social strata into a unitary language of culture and truth, the canonization of ideological systems, philology with its methods of studying and teaching dead languages, languages that were by that very fact "unities," Indo-European linguistics with its focus of attention, directed away from language plurality to a single proto-language—all this determined the content and power of the category of "unitary language" in linguistic and stylistic thought, and determined its creative, style-shaping role in the majority of the poetic genres that coalesced in the channel formed by those same centripetal forces of verbal-ideological life.

But the centripetal forces of the life of language, embodied in a "unitary language," operate in the midst of heteroglossia. At any given moment of its evolution, language is stratified not only into linguistic dialects in the strict sense of the word (according to for-

mal linguistic markers, especially phonetic), but also—and for us this is the essential point—into languages that are socio-ideological: languages of social groups, "professional" and "generic" languages, languages of generations and so forth. From this point of view, literary language itself is only one of these heteroglot languages—and in its turn is also stratified into languages (generic, period-bound and others). And this stratification and heteroglossia, once realized, is not only a static invariant of linguistic life, but also what insures its dynamics: stratification and heteroglossia widen and deepen as long as language is alive and developing. Alongside the centripetal forces, the centrifugal forces of language carry on their uninterrupted work; alongside verbal-ideological centralization and unification, the uninterrupted processes of decentralization and disunification go forward.

Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear. The processes of centralization and decentralization, of unification and disunification, intersect in the utterance; the utterance not only answers the requirements of its own language as an individualized embodiment of a speech act, but it answers the requirements of heteroglossia as well; it is in fact an active participant in such speech diversity. And this active participation of every utterance in living heteroglossia determines the linguistic profile and style of the utterance to no less a degree than its inclusion in any normative-centralizing system of a unitary language.

Every utterance participates in the "unitary language" (in its centripetal forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces).

Such is the fleeting language of a day, of an epoch, a social group, a genre, a school and so forth. It is possible to give a concrete and detailed analysis of any utterance, once having exposed it as a contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies in the life of language.

The authentic environment of an utterance, the environment in which it lives and takes shape, is dialogized heteroglossia, anonymous and social as language, but simultaneously concrete, filled with specific content and accented as an individual utterance.

At the time when major divisions of the poetic genres were developing under the influence of the unifying, centralizing, cen-

tripetal forces of verbal-ideological life, the novel—and those artistic-prose genres that gravitate toward it—was being historically shaped by the current of decentralizing, centrifugal forces. At the time when poetry was accomplishing the task of cultural, national and political centralization of the verbal-ideological world in the higher official socio-ideological levels, on the lower levels, on the stages of local fairs and at buffoon spectacles, the heteroglossia of the clown sounded forth, ridiculing all "languages" and dialects; there developed the literature of the *fabliaux* and *Schwänke* of street songs, folksayings, anecdotes, where there was no language-center at all, where there was to be found a lively play with the "languages" of poets, scholars, monks, knights and others, where all "languages" were masks and where no language could claim to be an authentic, incontestable face.

Heteroglossia, as organized in these low genres, was not merely heteroglossia vis-à-vis the accepted literary language (in all its various generic expressions), that is, vis-à-vis the linguistic center of the verbal-ideological life of the nation and the epoch, but was a heteroglossia consciously opposed to this literary language. It was parodic, and aimed sharply and polemically against the official languages of its given time. It was heteroglossia that had been dialogized.

Linguistics, stylistics and the philosophy of language that were born and shaped by the current of centralizing tendencies in the life of language have ignored this dialogized heteroglossia, in which is embodied the centrifugal forces in the life of language. For this very reason they could make no provision for the dialogic nature of language, which was a struggle among socio-linguistic points of view, not an intra-language struggle between individual wills or logical contradictions. Moreover, even intra-language dialogue (dramatic, rhetorical, cognitive or merely casual) has hardly been studied linguistically or stylistically up to the present day. One might even say outright that the dialogic aspect of discourse and all the phenomena connected with it have remained to the present moment beyond the ken of linguistics.

Stylistics has been likewise completely deaf to dialogue. A literary work has been conceived by stylistics as if it were a hermetic and self-sufficient whole, one whose elements constitute a closed system presuming nothing beyond themselves, no other utterances. The system comprising an artistic work was thought to be analogous with the system of a language, a system that

could not stand in a dialogic interrelationship with other languages. From the point of view of stylistics, the artistic work as a whole—whatever that whole might be—is a self-sufficient and closed authorial monologue, one that presumes only passive listeners beyond its own boundaries. Should we imagine the work as a rejoinder in a given dialogue, whose style is determined by its interrelationship with other rejoinders in the same dialogue (in the totality of the conversation)—then traditional stylistics does not offer an adequate means for approaching such a dialogized style. The sharpest and externally most marked manifestations of this stylistic category—the polemical style, the parodic, the ironic—are usually classified as rhetorical and not as poetic phenomena. Stylistics locks every stylistic phenomenon into the monologic context of a given self-sufficient and hermetic utterance, imprisoning it, as it were, in the dungeon of a single context; it is not able to exchange messages with other utterances; it is not able to realize its own stylistic implications in a relationship with them; it is obliged to exhaust itself in its own single hermetic context.

Linguistics, stylistics and the philosophy of language—as forces in the service of the great centralizing tendencies of European verbal-ideological life—have sought first and foremost for *unity* in diversity. This exclusive "orientation toward unity" in the present and past life of languages has concentrated the attention of philosophical and linguistic thought on the firmest, most stable, least changeable and most mono-semic aspects of discourse—on the *phonetic* aspects first of all—that are furthest removed from the changing socio-semantic spheres of discourse. Real ideologically saturated "language consciousness," one that participates in actual heteroglossia and multi-languagedness, has remained outside its field of vision. It is precisely this orientation toward unity that has compelled scholars to ignore all the verbal genres (quotidian, rhetorical, artistic-prose) that were the carriers of the decentralizing tendencies in the life of language, or that were in any case too fundamentally implicated in heteroglossia. The expression of this hetero- as well as polyglot consciousness in the specific forms and phenomena of verbal life remained utterly without determinative influence on linguistics and stylistic thought.

Therefore proper theoretical recognition and illumination could not be found for the specific feel for language and discourse

that one gets in stylizations, in *skaz*, in parodies and in various forms of verbal masquerade, "not talking straight," and in the more complex artistic forms for the organization of contradiction, forms that orchestrate their themes by means of languages—in all characteristic and profound models of novelistic prose, in Grimmelshausen, Cervantes, Rabelais, Fielding, Smollett, Sterne and others.

The problem of stylistics for the novel inevitably leads to the necessity of engaging a series of fundamental questions concerning the philosophy of discourse, questions connected with those aspects in the life of discourse that have had no light cast on them by linguistic and stylistic thought—that is, we must deal with the life and behavior of discourse in a contradictory and multi-languaged world.

Discourse in Poetry and Discourse in the Novel

For the philosophy of language, for linguistics and for stylistics structured on their base, a whole series of phenomena have therefore remained almost entirely beyond the realm of consideration: these include the specific phenomena that are present in discourse and that are determined by its dialogic orientation, first, amid others' utterances inside a *single* language (the primordial dialogism of discourse), amid other "social languages" within a single *national* language and finally amid different national languages within the same *culture*, that is, the same socio-ideological conceptual horizon.[7]

In recent decades, it is true, these phenomena have begun to attract the attention of scholars in language and stylistics, but their fundamental and wide-ranging significance in all spheres of the life of discourse is still far from acknowledged.

The dialogic orientation of a word among other words (of all kinds and degrees of otherness) creates new and significant artistic potential in discourse, creates the potential for a distinctive art of prose, which has found its fullest and deepest expression in the novel.

7. Linguistics acknowledges only a mechanical reciprocal influencing and intermixing of languages, (that is, one that is unconscious and determined by social conditions) which is reflected in abstract linguistic elements (phonetic and morphological).

We will focus our attention here on various forms and degrees of dialogic orientation in discourse, and on the special potential for a distinctive prose-art.

As treated by traditional stylistic thought, the word acknowledges only itself (that is, only its own context), its own object, its own direct expression and its own unitary and singular language. It acknowledges another word, one lying outside its own context, only as the neutral word of language, as the word of no one in particular, as simply the potential for speech. The direct word, as traditional stylistics understands it, encounters in its orientation toward the object only the resistance of the object itself (the impossibility of its being exhausted by a word, the impossibility of saying it all), but it does not encounter in its path toward the object the fundamental and richly varied opposition of another's word. No one hinders this word, no one argues with it.

But no living word relates to its object in a *singular* way: between the word and its object, between the word and the speaking subject, there exists an elastic environment of other, alien words about the same object, the same theme, and this is an environment that it is often difficult to penetrate. It is precisely in the process of living interaction with this specific environment that the word may be individualized and given stylistic shape.

Indeed, any concrete discourse (utterance) finds the object at which it was directed already as it were overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, charged with value, already enveloped in an obscuring mist—or, on the contrary, by the "light" of alien words that have already been spoken about it. It is entangled, shot through with shared thoughts, points of view, alien value judgments and accents. The word, directed toward its object, enters a dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgments and accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from others, intersects with yet a third group: and all this may crucially shape discourse, may leave a trace in all its semantic layers, may complicate its expression and influence its entire stylistic profile.

The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance; it cannot fail to become an active participant in social dialogue. After all, the utterance arises out of this dialogue as a continuation of it and as a rejoinder to it—it does not approach the object from the sidelines.

The way in which the word conceptualizes its object is a complex act—all objects, open to dispute and overlain as they are with qualifications, are from one side highlighted while from the other side dimmed by heteroglot social opinion, by an alien word about them.[8] And into this complex play of light and shadow the word enters—it becomes saturated with this play, and must determine within it the boundaries of its own semantic and stylistic contours. The way in which the word conceives its object is complicated by a dialogic interaction within the object between various aspects of its socio-verbal intelligibility. And an artistic representation, an "image" of the object, may be penetrated by this dialogic play of verbal intentions that meet and are interwoven in it; such an image need not stifle these forces, but on the contrary may activate and organize them. If we imagine the *intention* of such a word, that is, its *directionality toward the object*, in the form of a ray of light, then the living and unrepeatable play of colors and light on the facets of the image that it constructs can be explained as the spectral dispersion of the ray-word, not within the object itself (as would be the case in the play of an image-as-trope, in poetic speech taken in the narrow sense, in an "autotelic word"), but rather as its spectral dispersion in an atmosphere filled with the alien words, value judgments and accents through which the ray passes on its way toward the object; the social atmosphere of the word, the atmosphere that surrounds the object, makes the facets of the image sparkle.

The word, breaking through to its own meaning and its own expression across an environment full of alien words and variously evaluating accents, harmonizing with some of the elements in this environment and striking a dissonance with others, is able, in this dialogized process, to shape its own stylistic profile and tone.

Such is the *image in artistic prose* and the image of *novelistic*

8. Highly significant in this respect is the struggle that must be undertaken in such movements as Rousseauism, Naturalism, Impressionism, Acmeism, Dadaism, Surrealism and analogous schools with the "qualified" nature of the object (a struggle occasioned by the idea of a return to primordial consciousness, to original consciousness, to the object itself in itself, to pure perception and so forth).

prose in particular. In the atmosphere of the novel, the direct and unmediated intention of a word presents itself as something impermissably naive, something in fact impossible, for naiveté itself, under authentic novelistic conditions, takes on the nature of an internal polemic and is consequently dialogized (in, for example, the work of the Sentimentalists, in Chateaubriand and in Tolstoy). Such a dialogized image can occur in all the poetic genres as well, even in the lyric (to be sure, without setting the tone).[9] But such an image can fully unfold, achieve full complexity and depth and at the same time artistic closure, only under the conditions present in the genre of the novel.

In the poetic image narrowly conceived (in the image-as-trope), all activity—the dynamics of the image-as-word—is completely exhausted by the play between the word (with all its aspects) and the object (in all its aspects). The word plunges into the inexhaustible wealth and contradictory multiplicity of the object itself, with its "virginal," still "unuttered" nature; therefore it presumes nothing beyond the borders of its own context (except, of course, what can be found in the treasure-house of language itself). The word forgets that its object has its own history of contradictory acts of verbal recognition, as well as that heteroglossia that is always present in such acts of recognition.

For the writer of artistic prose, on the contrary, the object reveals first of all precisely the socially heteroglot multiplicity of its names, definitions and value judgments. Instead of the virginal fullness and inexhaustibility of the object itself, the prose writer confronts a multitude of routes, roads and paths that have been laid down in the object by social consciousness. Along with the internal contradictions inside the object itself, the prose writer witnesses as well the unfolding of social heteroglossia *surrounding* the object, the Tower-of-Babel mixing of languages that goes on around any object; the dialectics of the object are interwoven with the social dialogue surrounding it. For the prose writer, the object is a focal point for heteroglot voices among which his own voice must also sound; these voices create the background necessary for his own voice, outside of which his artistic prose nuances cannot be perceived, and without which they "do not sound."

The prose artist elevates the social heteroglossia surrounding objects into an image that has finished contours, an image com-

9. The Horatian lyric, Villon, Heine, Laforgue, Annenskij and others—despite the fact that these are extremely varied instances.

pletely shot through with dialogized overtones; he creates artistically calculated nuances on all the fundamental voices and tones of this heteroglossia. But as we have already said, every extra-artistic prose discourse—in any of its forms, quotidian, rhetorical, scholarly—cannot fail to be oriented toward the "already uttered," the "already known," the "common opinion" and so forth. The dialogic orientation of discourse is a phenomenon that is, of course, a property of *any* discourse. It is the natural orientation of any living discourse. On all its various routes toward the object, in all its directions, the word encounters an alien word and cannot help encountering it in a living, tension-filled interaction. Only the mythical Adam, who approached a virginal and as yet verbally unqualified world with the first word, could really have escaped from start to finish this dialogic inter-orientation with the alien word that occurs in the object. Concrete historical human discourse does not have this privilege: it can deviate from such inter-orientation only on a conditional basis and only to a certain degree.

It is all the more remarkable that linguistics and the philosophy of discourse have been primarily oriented precisely toward this artificial, preconditioned status of the word, a word excised from dialogue and taken for the norm (although the primacy of dialogue over monologue is frequently proclaimed). Dialogue is studied merely as a compositional form in the structuring of speech, but the internal dialogism of the word (which occurs in a monologic utterance as well as in a rejoinder), the dialogism that penetrates its entire structure, all its semantic and expressive layers, is almost entirely ignored. But it is precisely this internal dialogism of the word, which does not assume any external compositional forms of dialogue, that cannot be isolated as an independent act, separate from the word's ability to form a concept [*koncipirovanie*] of its object—it is precisely this internal dialogism that has such enormous power to shape style. The internal dialogism of the word finds expression in a series of peculiar features in semantics, syntax and stylistics that have remained up to the present time completely unstudied by linguistics and stylistics (nor, what is more, have the peculiar semantic features of ordinary dialogue been studied).

The word is born in a dialogue as a living rejoinder within it; the word is shaped in dialogic interaction with an alien word that is already in the object. A word forms a concept of its own object in a dialogic way.